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The nature and normative properties of competition in health care
markets have long been the subject of much debate. In this paper we
consider what the optimal benchmark is in the presence of moral
hazard effects on consumption due to health insurance. Intuitively, it
seems that imperfect competition in the health care market may constrain this moral hazard by increasing prices. We show that this intuition cannot be correct if insurance markets are competitive. A competitive insurance market will always produce a contract that leaves
consumers at least as well off under lower prices as under higher
prices.

We have benefited from helpful comments by Ashish Arora, David Dranove, Ted Frech,
Cobi Glazer, Dan Kessler, Tom McGuire, Mark Pauly, Jim Rebitzer, Bill Rogerson, Dennis
Yao, the editor, and an anonymous referee as well as participants in seminars at Case
Western Reserve, Cornell, Penn, the third biennial conference on the Industrial Organization of Health Care, and the 1998 American Economic Association meetings. This
research was supported in part by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
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Introduction

The nature and normative properties of competition in health care
markets have long been the subject of debate. Many policy makers have
reservations toward competition in health care markets. For example,
hospital entry, investment, and service offerings have been regulated via
state certificate of need regulations and health planning agencies, and
pricing has been regulated by hospital “all-payer” regulation in some
states and by Medicare and Medicaid. Additionally, federal antitrust
enforcement agencies were not vigorous in health care prior to the late
1970s. Currently, as consolidation rapidly occurs in health care markets,
concern about reduced competition has arisen (Gaynor and HaasWilson 1999).
Antitrust enforcement policy in health has been based on the view
that health care is like all other industries (e.g., Weller 1983; Bingaman
1995). Thus competition serves as the benchmark. In particular, distortions in health care markets, and their impacts on the socially optimal
amount of competition, are not considered. Some have argued that
particular distortions that characterize health care markets imply that
competition is not optimal (Crew 1969; Robinson and Luft 1985; Lynk
1995).
In this paper we consider what the optimal benchmark is in the presence of moral hazard. Moral hazard is widely recognized as one of the
most important distortions in health care markets. In general, economic
analysis suggests that marginal cost pricing leads to static Pareto-optimal
allocations. In health care markets, however, moral hazard due to health
insurance leads to excess consumption, in the sense that insured individuals will consume medical services past the point at which the marginal utility of an additional service is equal to its marginal cost (Arrow
1963; Pauly 1968). In this context, it is not obvious that price equal to
marginal cost is optimal in the medical market.
While the problem of optimal insurance in the presence of moral
hazard has been extensively analyzed (e.g., Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968;
Zeckhauser 1970), the issue of the optimal amount of competition in
the presence of moral hazard has not. Intuitively, it seems that imperfect
competition in the medical care market may constrain this moral hazard
by increasing prices. This intuition derives from the theory of the second-best, in which a second distortion may improve performance in a
market already immutably distorted. An early paper by Crew (1969)
reaches this conclusion using graphical arguments. This intuition has
been established as a kind of folk theorem in health economics (Frech
1996; Pauly 1998; Folland, Goodman, and Stano 2001) and has influenced thinking about the optimality of competition in medical markets
(e.g., Dor and Rizzo 1995).
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An important limitation of this result is that the endogenous determination of the degree of consumer cost sharing by the insurance industry is not considered. These papers do not allow insurers to alter
coinsurance rates in response to changes in medical prices. Insurers do
appear to alter their policies in response to medical prices (Phelps 1973;
Frech 1979).
We model the optimal amount of health insurance and competition,
given risk aversion and moral hazard. We show that if insurance markets
are competitive and insurers set the degree of consumer cost sharing
optimally, then contrary to the standard intuition, adding another distortion does not improve welfare. Since the insurer has already made
the trade-off between risk reduction and moral hazard, a price increase
in the medical market cannot wring any further surplus out of the
resulting decrease in moral hazard. Thus imperfect competition in medical markets cannot have efficiency-enhancing effects, even in the presence of moral hazard. Furthermore, when the medical market is not
competitive and already exhibits prices above marginal costs, price increases lead to lower welfare and price decreases lead to higher welfare.
The principal claim of this paper is that most of economists’ intuition
regarding the welfare effects of price changes in markets not distorted
by moral hazard applies quite well to markets in which decision making
by consumers is distorted by moral hazard. In particular, lower prices
are better for consumers than higher prices. Furthermore, the gain to
consumers from lowering price from supramarginal cost levels to marginal costs outweighs the loss of profit to the medical industry.
The basic model and setup of the paper are presented in Section II.
Section III contains the main analysis in the paper: the normative properties of competition when the insurance market is competitive and free
to respond optimally to price levels in the medical market. Section IV
summarizes the discussion and presents conclusions.
II.

The Model

We use a standard model of insurance. There is a (measure 1) continuum of consumers, all of whom are identical except with regard to the
realization of a random variable, e, which is a shock to health. Consumers
are uncertain ex ante with regard to the realization of e, although they
know its distribution. The size of the loss associated with a realization
of e is privately known to the consumer ex post (or at least is not
verifiable to a court or other contract enforcer) and is remediable (at
least in part) through the consumption of a good, which we shall call
the medical good. The medical good has a price, p, and is produced
at a constant marginal cost, c. Insurance contracts take the form of a
premium, assessed with certainty, and a partial cost reimbursement for
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consumption of the medical good. A contract is a pair (t, m), where m
is the premium paid by the consumer to the insurance company, and
t 苸 [0, p] is the price faced by the consumer for the medical good. The
insurance company implements this price by facing the consumer with
a coinsurance rate v p t/p so that the insurance company reimburses
the consumer a fraction 1 ⫺ v of his expenditures on the medical good.
Consumption of medical care is determined in the following way.
Consider a consumer possessing an insurance contract, (t, m). After the
consumer’s loss, e, is realized, he solves
max U(Y ⫺ tx ⫺ m, x, e)
x

subject to
x ≥ 0,
I { Y ⫺ tx ⫺ m ≥ 0,
where Y is the consumer’s income, x is the quantity of the medical good
consumed, and I is consumption of a composite nonmedical commodity.
We denote the solution to this problem x ∗(Y ⫺ m, t, e). Substituting x∗
into U yields the consumer’s indirect utility function, V(Y ⫺ m, t, e).
Taking expectations over e defines the expected indirect utility function:
EV(Y ⫺ m, t) p E{V(Y ⫺ m, t, e)}.
We assume throughout that U1 1 0,
U1
U2

r ⬁,

Ir0

U1

r 0,
U 2 xr0

and the insurance industry encounters no administrative costs.
The profits of the medical and insurance industries may be calculated
as follows:
pi p m ⫺ E{(p ⫺ t)x ∗},
pm p E{(p ⫺ c)x ∗}.
The consumer will consume the medical good to the point at which
U 2 /U1 p t. If the medical good is normal, if there is a perfectly competitive medical market (so that p p c), and if t ! p, then this consumption will not be optimal, ex post. Too much of the medical good
will be consumed.
A graphical depiction (based on Crew [1969]) of this standard analysis
is presented in figure 1. The ex post demand curve for the medical
good is denoted D(p). Insurance contracts distort demand by facing
consumers with only a proportion v of their expenses for medical care,
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Fig. 1.—Standard analysis

and this leads to the distorted ex post demand curve D(vp). The ex post
efficiency loss due to moral hazard at price P1 is the area A. When price
falls from P1 to marginal cost at P2, welfare loss increases to the area
A ⫹ B. So when prices decrease from supramarginal cost levels to marginal costs, there is an additional welfare loss, the area B.
However, ex post efficiency is not a sensible welfare criterion here
since it ignores the benefits to obtaining insurance ex ante (Feldstein
1973; Feldman and Dowd 1991). Our purpose in the next section is to
evaluate under what conditions a price increase (relative to marginal
cost pricing) in the medical market can improve ex ante efficiency.
III.

The Second-Best

While the argument summarized in figure 1 is intuitive, it turns out that
it is right only if the insurance market does not respond to the price
change in the medical market (i.e., it assumes that v stays the same after
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the change in price). In this section, we relax that assumption and see
that, in contrast to figure 1, price increases above marginal costs lead
to declines in welfare.
For the propositions below, the medical market’s price is set (by fiat
or by an oligopoly or competitive equilibrium), and the medical producers supply whatever quantity is demanded at some constant marginal
cost, c. The insurance industry is competitive; thus we assume that it
chooses insurance policies (t, m) that maximize consumer welfare, conditional on a break-even constraint. We assume that consumers obtain
insurance from one insurer at the terms specified in the insurance
contract, that is, that insurers may write enforceable contracts forbidding
consumers from purchasing multiple policies. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991)
have termed this an “exclusive (quantity) contract.” A competitive equilibrium exists in this case and is constrained efficient when there is only
one consumer good (Pauly 1974; Arnott and Stiglitz 1991).
A.

Consumer Welfare

In proposition 1, we show that consumers benefit from a price decline
in the medical market. In the discussion afterward, we show that the
result of proposition 1 holds even for a monopolist insurer. Proposition
2 then shows that social welfare rises when price falls, as long as price
is above marginal cost. Again, the discussion afterward shows that this
result applies to a monopolist insurer as well.
Proposition 1. Assume that the insurance market is competitive and
U is nondecreasing in its first argument. Then consumers are (weakly)
better off if price decreases in the medical market.
Proof. The problem of the competitive insurance industry is to
max EV(Y ⫺ m, t)
t,m

subject to
m ≥ E{(p ⫺ t)x ∗(t, e)},
0 ≤ t ≤ p.
We shall consider a price decline from some price p1 to p2. We shall
show that, for each feasible contract under p1, there exists a feasible
contract under p2 that leaves consumers at least as well off. Let (t1, m1)
be a feasible contract under price p1. There are two possibilities to be
considered: t 1 ≤ p 2 and t 1 1 p 2.
First, suppose that t 1 ≤ p 2. Now consider a contract under price
2
p ! p 1. Choose m 1 p m 2 and t 1 p t 2. Observe that the consumer makes
precisely the same choice of x, pays the same amount for it out of pocket,
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and pays the same premium as under the optimal contract at price p1.
Thus he is as well off under this contract as he was under the contract
at price p1. Since p 2 ≤ p 1, this new contract is feasible (it does not violate
the insurance industry’s break-even constraint) at the new price.
Now suppose that t 1 1 p 2. Consider moving the consumer to a situation of no insurance, t 2 p p 2 and m 2 p 0. Clearly this is a feasible
choice for the insurer. Now, we check that the consumer is better off
at this contract and the lower price than he was at the old contract and
price. Consider the consumer’s optimization problem again:
max x U(Y ⫺ tx ⫺ m, x, e). Under the new price and contract, the consumer faces a lower effective price (t 1 1 p 2 ) and a higher effective income (m 1 ≥ 0) for each realization of e. Standard results from consumer
theory imply that this will not decrease utility if U is nondecreasing in
its first argument, as we have assumed. Q.E.D.
This proposition establishes that consumer welfare is decreasing in
the price of the medical good. This implies that competition is indeed
second-best optimal, from the consumer’s point of view, in medical
markets in the presence of moral hazard.
Another result worth mentioning is that consumers’ welfare is decreasing in medical price even if the insurance industry is monopolized
(but not monopsonized). The insurance industry then solves
max {m ⫺ (p ⫺ t)E{x ∗(t, e)}}
t,m

subject to
0 ≤ t ≤ p,
EV(Y ⫺ m, t) ≥ EV(Y, p).
As long as utility is increasing in its first argument, the “participation
constraint” will bind at the solution to this problem. Since a decrease
in price clearly increases EV(Y, p), a decrease in price will improve consumers’ welfare.1

B.

Social Welfare

A price decrease in the medical market may benefit consumers; however,
it is also likely to harm producers in the medical industry (i.e., profits
are likely to fall). To consider the impacts on social welfare, we obviously
1
We note that this result follows trivially from the nature of insurance demand in this
model. Since consumers buy either a fixed quantity of insurance or none at all, monopoly
has no effects on quantity and thus no efficiency effects. The monopolist simply raises its
price to extract the entire risk premium from consumers.
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want to see whether the harm to producers is smaller than the benefit
to consumers of a price decline.
To avoid analytical difficulties, we substantially restrict the form of
the utility function to eliminate income effects:
U(Y ⫺ tx ⫺ m, x, e) p n(Y ⫺ tx ⫺ m ⫹ g(x, e)),
n(x) p ⫺ exp (⫺rx),
g 1 1 0, g 2 ! 0, g 12 1 0, g 11 ! 0.
The separability inside n guarantees that there are no income effects
ex post. The assumption of an exponential form for n guarantees that
there are no income effects ex ante. The two assumptions together are
the familiar “no income effects” formulation used frequently in partial
equilibrium welfare analysis (Willig 1976). As also is typical, we assume
that income is great enough that consumers will never wish to spend
all of their income on the medical good. The assumptions on g capture
the fact that e represents “medical need.” Higher e causes both lower
utility and an increase in the efficacy of the medical good in producing
utility.
The competitive insurance industry’s problem is as above:
max EV(Y ⫺ m, t)
t,m

subject to
m ≥ E{(p ⫺ t)x ∗(t, e)},
0 ≤ t ≤ p.
This problem has a solution since the theorem of the maximum ensures that the insurance industry is optimizing a continuous function
{E{n(⫺m(t, p) ⫹ max {⫺tx ⫹ g(x, e)})}}
x

over a compact set [0, p]. Furthermore, we show below in lemma 1 that
the optimal effective price is t ! p.
The insurance industry’s problem, in general, is not concave; nor is
it quasi-concave. Furthermore, without additional assumptions, we cannot rule out t p 0 as a solution. Since different choices of (consumer
optimal) t lead to different levels of social welfare through their effects
on pm, levels of welfare will be determined by which t is chosen for each
price. In what follows, we shall assume that t(p) is a selection from the
optimal correspondence.
Since there are no income effects, we may calculate welfare (in
dollars) simply by summing medical industry profits and consumer willingness to pay. Alternatively, we may calculate welfare (in utils) by adding
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medical industry profits to the consumer’s income. For a particular price
in the medical market, p, and profits in the medical market, pm, welfare
is
W(p, Y, pm) p exp [⫺r(Y ⫹ pm)] max {E{n(⫺m (t, p)
t苸[0,p]

⫹ max {⫺tx ⫹ g(x, e)})}}.
x

Of course, pm is determined in equilibrium as pm p (p ⫺ c)x ∗(t). By
our assumption of no income effects, the maximizing t is not affected
by the level of pm. We write the (selection from the set of) optimal
insurance contract (t ∗(p), m∗(p)). Then welfare at a price p is defined
to be
W(p) p W(p, Y, (p ⫺ c)x ∗(t ∗)).
We now establish a series of lemmas, which we then use to prove our
main proposition. We first adapt the following result of Zeckhauser
(1970) to our setting.
Lemma 1. In any optimal insurance contract, t 苸 [0, p).
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the next lemma, fix a price p 0 1 0 and (inductively) construct
sequences {pn} and {tn} as follows. Choose
tn 苸 arg max {E{n(⫺m(t, pn) ⫹ max {⫺tx ⫹ g(x, e)})}}.
t苸[0,pn]

x

Set pn⫹1 p tn.
Lemma 2. pn r 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3. Any t(p), a selection from
arg max E{U(Y ⫺ m(t, p) ⫺ tx(t, e), x(t, e), e)},
t苸[0,p]

m(t, p) p (p ⫺ t)E{x(t, e)},
with a utility function having no income effects, is nondecreasing in p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 4. Fix p 1 1 c. Let (t1, m1) be an associated optimal contract
and pm1 the medical industry profit. Let p2 be a price satisfying p 2 1 c
and t 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ p 1 with associated optimal contract (t2, m2) and medical
industry profit pm2. Then W(p 1) ≤ W(p 2 ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now establish the main result of this section: that welfare is declining in price, for prices greater than marginal cost.
Proposition 2. If 0 ≤ c ≤ p ≤ p , then W(p) ≥ W(p  ).
Proof. Construct sequences, {pi} and {tn}, as in the discussion before
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lemma 2, using p as the starting point. Since pn r 0, pn ! p eventually.
Find the least n, call it N, for which pn ! p. We claim that
W(p  ) p W(p 0 ) ≤ W(p 1) ≤ W(p 2) ≤ … ≤ W(p N⫺1) ≤ W(p).
The first equality follows from the definition of {pn}. Consider any arbitrary inequality in the list, except the last one. Since pn p tn⫺1 , we can
simply apply lemma 4 directly to prove the inequality. For the final
inequality, we know by the choice of N and the construction of {pn} that
tN⫺1 p p N ≤ p ≤ p N⫺1. The inequality follows by lemma 4 again. Q.E.D.
This proposition establishes that, under the usual partial equilibrium
assumptions, the usual result that welfare is decreasing in price for prices
greater than marginal cost holds. This is the central result of the paper.
It establishes that moral hazard in medical markets is not, per se, an
argument for prices higher than marginal costs in the medical market;
thus it is not an argument for laxity in antitrust enforcement or for
blockading entry in medical markets.
Although we do not offer an explicit argument, this result follows for
a monopolist insurer as well, again because the monopolist insurer captures all surplus. In addition, it can also be shown that marginal cost
prices are socially optimal if the insurer is a managed care organization
that sets quantity given to a consumer on the basis of a signal of e.2
IV.

Summary and Conclusions

In this paper we have considered what the appropriate competitive
benchmark is for medical markets in the presence of moral hazard.
Moral hazard due to insurance introduces a distortion into the medical
market that requires analysis of the second-best. In the presence of moral
hazard due to health insurance, consumers will demand “too much”
medical care ex post. However, contrary to the conventional wisdom, if
insurance markets are competitive, or possibly even if they are monopolized, consumers benefit from reduced prices in the medical market.
Furthermore, provided that price exceeds marginal cost in the medical
market, the benefit to consumers of a price decrease outweighs the loss
in profits suffered by the medical industry. So, under the presumption
that competition causes prices to fall in the medical industry, the mere
existence of moral hazard should not cast doubt on the general intuition
that more competition is socially beneficial. Further, moral hazard per
se is not an argument for lax antitrust enforcement or for erecting
barriers to entry in the medical market.
We must apply some caveats to these conclusions, however. In this
paper we have analyzed only one of the distortions in medical markets:
2

Proofs of both of these propositions are available on request from the authors.
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moral hazard. We have not considered other factors that are commonly
cited in rendering competition in medical markets different: risk selection in insurance markets, agency problems in medical markets (i.e.,
induced demand), and the presence of not-for-profit firms. It remains
for future research to consider the constellation of these imperfections
in concert.

Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Since the constraint on the insurance company is t 苸 [0, p] , we show that
t p p cannot be optimal. Since EV(Y ⫺ m(t), t) is differentiable by the functional
form assumptions and the assumptions on g, it will suffice to show that
(⭸/⭸t)EV(y ⫺ m(t), t) is negative at t p p :
⭸
⭸
EV(y ⫺ m(t), t) p E n(Y ⫺ m(t) ⫹ max {⫺tx ⫹ g(x, e)})
⭸t
⭸t
x

{
{ [

p E n (7) ⫺

}

⭸
m(t) ⫺ x ∗(t, e)
⭸t

]}

(from the envelope theorem). Now, we evaluate ⭸m(t)/⭸t at t p p :
m(t) p E{(p ⫺ t)x ∗(t, e)},
⭸
⭸
m(t) p E ⫺x ∗(t, e) ⫹ (p ⫺ t) x ∗(t, e) ,
⭸t
⭸t

{

⭸
m(t)
⭸t

F

}

p ⫺E{x ∗(t, e)}.

tpp

After substitution,
⭸
EV(y ⫺ m(t), t)
⭸t

F

p E{n (7)[E{x ∗(p, e)} ⫺ x ∗(p, e)]}

tpp

p ⫺ Cov [n (7), x ∗]
! 0.

The last inequality follows from the assumptions on g and n. Since g 12 1 0 and
g 11 ! 0, x∗ must be increasing in e. However, since g 2 ! 0, max x {⫺px ⫹ g(x, e)} must
be decreasing in e. Thus the argument of n is decreasing in e. Since n is concave,
n is increasing in e. Thus both n and x∗ are increasing in e, establishing the
inequality. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the contrary. Then since pn ≥ 0 and pn is nonincreasing (since tn 苸
[0, pn]), pn r p∗ 1 0. But this implies that tn r p∗ for pn⫹1 p tn. The theorem of
the maximum then establishes that
p∗ 苸 arg max {E{n(⫺m(t, p∗) ⫹ max {⫺tx ⫹ g(x, e)})}}.
t苸[0,p∗]

x

This contradicts lemma 1. Thus pn r 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Notice that
E{U(Y ⫺ m(t, p) ⫺ tx(t, e), x(t, e), e)}
p exp [⫺r(Y ⫺ m(t, p))]E{U(⫺tx(t, e), x(t, e), e)},
by our assumptions on the utility function, and that the values of this function
are negative. Since ⫺(1/r) ln (⫺x) is a strictly increasing function, we can define
Û(Y ⫺ m(t, p) ⫺ tx(t, e), x(t, e), e)
1
p ⫺ ln [⫺E{U(Y ⫺ m(t, p) ⫺ tx(t, e), x(t, e), e)}]
r
and maximize it instead. The solutions to
max E{U(Y ⫺ m(t, p) ⫺ tx(t, e), x(t, e), e)}
t苸[0,p]

and
1
max Y ⫺ m(t, p) ⫺ ln [⫺E{U(⫺tx(t, e), x(t, e), e)}]
r
t苸[0,p]
are the same. The cross partial of Û with respect to p and t is nonnegative, at
⫺

⭸ 2m
⭸x(t, e)
p⫺
.
⭸p⭸t
⭸t

ˆ
Let t be the largest maximizer at price p. Then for all t̃ ≤ t, U(t,
p) ⫺
ˆ ˜ p) ≥ 0. Consider, now, price p  1 p. The cross-partial between p and t positive
U(t,
implies that
ˆ
ˆ ˜ p  ) ≥ U(t,
ˆ
ˆ ˜ p) ≥ 0.
G t˜ ≤ t, U(t,
p  ) ⫺ U(t,
p) ⫺ U(t,
Also, t continues to be feasible at p . Thus any maximizer under p  1 p must be
greater than or equal to t. Q.E.D.
Note that the argument in lemma 3 is a simple supermodularity argument
(see Milgrom and Shannon 1994, theorem 4).
Proof of Lemma 4
We seek to show that
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W(p ) p E{n(Y ⫹ p ⫺ m ⫹ max {⫺t x ⫹ g(x, e)})}
1

1
m

1

1

x

≤ max E{n(Y ⫹ p ⫺ (p 1 ⫺ p 2 )E{x ∗(t 1, e)} ⫺ m(t, p 2 )
1
m

t苸[0,p1]

⫹ max {⫺tx ⫹ g(x, e)})}
x

p E{n(Y ⫹ pm1 ⫺ (p 1 ⫺ p 2 )E{x ∗(t 1, e)} ⫺ m 2 ⫹ max {⫺t 2x ⫹ g(x, e)})}
x

≤ E{n(Y ⫹ p ⫺ m ⫹ max {⫺t x ⫹ g(x, e)})}
2
m

2

2

x
2

p W(p ).
The first inequality follows since, when t is set equal to t1, the objective function
in the second line is equal to the first line. The maximization assumption then
guarantees the inequality. To show the second inequality, it will suffice to show
that pm1 ⫺ (p 1 ⫺ p 2 )Ex ∗(t 1, e) ≤ pm2. Consider the following:
pm1 ⫺ (p 1 ⫺ p 2 )Ex ∗(t 1, e) p (p 1 ⫺ c)Ex ∗(t 1, e) ⫺ (p 1 ⫺ p 2 )Ex ∗(t 1, e)
p (p 2 ⫺ c)Ex ∗(t 1, e)
≤ (p 2 ⫺ c)Ex ∗(t 2, e)
p pm2.
The inequality follows since t(p) is nondecreasing and demand is downwardsloping (no income effects). Q.E.D.
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